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NOTES
ESTIMATING AGGREGATE DAMAGES IN CLASS-ACTION
LITIGATION UNDER RULE 10b-5 FOR PURPOSES
OF SETTLEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators have increasingly accepted the application
of financial theory to damages calculations' in litigation2 brought by
shareholders under Rule lOb-5.3 A small body of legal and financial
literature describes and advocates the use of damages computation mod-
els and procedures. The damages models are designed to estimate the
"per-share damages" for each day in which purchases or sales of a secur-
ity are affected by a fraud. These models, however, generally fail to con-
front the problems posed in estimating "aggregate damages" for a class.
An accurate estimation of aggregate damages for class actions is particu-
larly important for purposes of settlement because few Rule lOb-5 cases
go to judgment.4
1. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 nn.24-26 (1988)(citing arti-
cles and cases supporting application of financial theory and fraud-on-the-market theory);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 & n.22 (2d Cir.)(technical compu-
tations "may be used in" computing damages)(citing cases), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1248-49 (7th Cir.) (technical dam-
ages formula adopted), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1
passim (1982)(discussing general precepts applied in per-share calculations); Cornell &
Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37
UCLA L. Rev. 883 passim (1990)(discussing problems arising in application of financial
theory to per-share damage calculations); Note, The Fraud on the Market Theory and the
Efficient Markets Hypothesis: Applying a Consistent Standard, 14 J. Corp. L. 443, 477-83
(1988)(application of market model to quantification of damages).
2. Damages analysis is primarily relevant to private Rule lob-5 litigation. It is ac-
cepted that the key to enforcing Rule lOb-5 is the availability of a private cause of action
to shareholders who have relied on a fraud, generally a misrepresentation or omission of a
material fact, that has distorted the market price of a security. See, eg., Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988)(a private cause of action certainly exists under
Rule lOb-5 and is key to enforcing 1934 Act); Comment, The Fraud on the Market The-
ory: The Debate Rages On, 27 Duq. L. Rev. 277, 277 n.2 (1988)(citing Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) as first federal court case which
implied private cause of action under Rule lOb-5).
An increasing number of private Rule lOb-5 cases have been class actions brought on
behalf of all shareholders affected by the fraud. See e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224 (1988); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Sirota v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); In re Warner
Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
4. See Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions,43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 524-26; Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in lOb-5 Cases,
31 Bus. Law. 1839, 1852-54 (1976); Note, Rule 10b-5 Damage Computation: Application
of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 838, 838 n.2
(1983).
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Litigants must know the total sum of money at stake in order accu-
rately to determine the risks of further litigation. They also rely on esti-
mates of total potential damages to negotiate the size of any pool of
money to settle claims.5 An assessment of total actual damages is like-
wise essential to judges who must ultimately approve class-action settle-
ments and fees.6 Finally, damages estimates may be critical in cases that
actually go to trial. In bifurcated trials, for example, which determine
liability before examining the issue of damages, courts may hesitate to
recognize liability if subsequent exorbitant damages awards threaten the
defendant with inappropriate harm.7
While the traditional per-share models aid judges and class-action liti-
gants in estimating per-share damages under Rule lOb-5, these financial
models are subject to a number of limitations and complications. The
models also fail to analyze all the relevant factors necessary to establish a
methodology for estimating aggregate damages for class actions under
Rule lOb-5. Specifically, they don't determine the number of shares af-
fected by the fraud. In an effort to bridge this gap, this Note presents a
practical model for estimating aggregate damages of defrauded share-
holders in Rule lOb-5 class-action litigation.
Part I of this Note briefly reviews the elements of Rule lob-5 liability
and the implications for calculating damages, and surveys general theo-
ries of damages under Rule lOb-5. Part II discusses the application of
financial theory to damages calculations and reviews the employment of
the market model, which is based on the capital asset pricing model
("CAPM"),s in calculations of damages on a per-share basis. Part II also
discusses certain modifications and limitations of the per-share model.
Part III proposes expanding the per-share model in order to present a
practical method of estimating aggregate class-wide damages and dis-
5. See Reder, supra note 4, at 1852. Cf. Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages
in Security Cases and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 277, 277-
78 (1977)(because few decisions on measure of damages and potential of "ruinous" dam-
ages, litigants often settle securities fraud cases rather than proceed to trial).
6. See Reder, supra note 4, at 1839 ("[j]udicial confusion over the appropriate mea-
sure of damages against fraudulent sellers has hindered settlement discussions because
neither party can accurately view the ultimate potential recovery"); see also Bonime v.
Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1382-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(settlement of class action reasonable
in light of difficulties of computing true value of stock as of transaction date), aff'd 556
F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
7. See, eg., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 320-21 (6th Cir. 1976)(finding of
liability would present situation without natural limitations on damages), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1053 (1977); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 269 (3d Cir.)
(in class action suits with massive potential damages, courts may increase plaintiff's bur-
den of proof), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Mullaney, supra note 5, at 290-93 (dis-
cussing impact of damages on findings of liability).
For an interesting discussion of the problems of ruinous damage awards, see Note, The
Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 Stan. L.
Rev. 371, 377 n.35 and accompanying text (1974).
8. The capital asset pricing model analyzes the relationship between risk and rate of
return and is based on the theory that an investor will demand a higher return if he takes
a higher risk. See infra note 39.
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cusses this proposed model's key variables. Two approaches that may be
used to compute the number of shares affected by the fraud, the Propor-
tional Trading Model ("PTM") and the Accelerated Trading Model
("ATM"), are presented and considered. Part III also discusses the em-
ployment of aggregate-damages analyses in settlement. This Note con-
cludes that while there are variables that are difficult to reflect
formulaically in the proposed model, the model should provide an ade-
quate framework for estimating aggregate class-wide damages in Rule
lOb-5 actions to guide litigators and courts for purposes of settlement.
I. BACKGROUND AND THEORIES OF DAMAGES IN RULE l01b-5 CASES
A. Rule 10b-5 Actions: Elements and Damages
The basic elements of a Rule lOb-5 action are well-established. As set
forth by the Supreme Court, in Basic v. Levinson9 and its predecessors,
the six basic elements of a Rule lOb-5 action are: 1) a sale or purchase of
any security; 2) a misrepresentation, misstatement or nondisclosure
3) of a material fact; 4) scienter or intention to deceive or defraud;
5) reliance on the misstatement or nondisclosure; and 6) causation by
the violation of the transaction and the injury.10 These elements set pa-
rameters for determining whether plaintiffs have been injured by a de-
fendant and roughly define how these injuries should be measured.
A threshold requirement in private actions under Rule l0b-5, some-
times called the Birnbaum rule, " limits liability to those damages occur-
ring "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."' 2
Accordingly, stockholders will not receive compensation for losses on
shares merely owned and not traded during the period of fraud, even
though owners of these shares may suffer from fraud-related market dis-
tortion. 3 The damages model therefore seeks to measure the fraud-re-
9. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
10. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 226, 231, 242-45, 260 (1988); TSC In-
dus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-47 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975). See generally Cobine, Elements of Liability and
Actual Damages in Rule lOb-S Actions, 1972 U. Ill. L. F. 651, 651-67, 683-90 (describing
some parameters of liability); Note, supra note 1, at 456-57 n. 114 (listing elements and
supporting cases).
11. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
12. See id. at 463; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 734-35
(1975); Cobine, supra note 10, at 652; Note, supra note 1, at 456.
13. For example, a stockholder who owns 100 shares of stock prior to the date of a
proven misrepresentation, and buys 100 shares thereafter, will only recover for losses as
to the 100 newly purchased shares. Yet his investment decision to retain the previously
purchased shares, and their ultimate value, may also be affected by the fraud (e.g. "I
would have sold if I had known the truth"). To the extent that payments of damages are
made by the errant corporation directly, rather than by officers, directors or other wrong-
doers, trading shareholders are effectively compensated at the expense of non-trading
shareholders.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
lated losses only as to shares that were traded during the period when
fraud distorted the market price.
Assuming there has been a misrepresentation, the element of material-
ity precludes recovery where the defendant's wrongdoing is minimal and
not considered the cause of plaintiff's injury. 4 In applying the material-
ity element, the federal courts employ a "reasonable investor" standard,
looking to whether a reasonable investor would place significance on the
withheld or misrepresented information.15 In cases involving actively
traded securities, the significance of such information and its impact on
the total mix of available data is best reflected in the actual effect of the
information, if any, on the market prices of the securities. 6 Through
market analysis, the damages model must distinguish between fraud-
based market price distortion and changes in market prices caused by
other factors, such as general market or economic conditions. The ques-
tion of materiality thus straddles issues of law and financial analysis.
The reliance element of Rule lOb-5, rooted in the common-law tort of
fraud,17 requires a plaintiff to show that he relied on defendant's fraudu-
14. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240-41 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 446 F.2d
1301, 1305 (2d Cir.)(expanding the application of Rule lOb-5 to material disclosures in
public documents), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
The Court in Basic, following the language of Rule lOb-5, noted that technically, "in
order to prevail on a Rule lob-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were
misleading as to a material fact." Basic, 485 U.S., at 238 (emphasis in original). In
practice, however, this tends to mean "materially misleading as to a material fact." Cf id.
at 240 (information must be significant to a reasonable investor).
15. See Basic, 485 U.S. 224, 240. A misrepresentation is not considered material and
will not trigger Rule lOb-5 liability unless it significantly alters the "total mix" of market
data. See id. at 231-32 (emphasis added).
16. Examining the effect on market prices of the fraud's disclosure or correction is
one objective test of materiality that courts and analysts use to assess whether the market
believed and responded to the misrepresentation. See e.g., James v. Nico Energy Corp.,
838 F.2d 1365, 1371 (5th Cir. 1988)(market value for calculating out-of-pocket injury is
measured at reasonable time after concealed information has been disclosed to general
public and stock is at its true value); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc. 673 F.2d 566, 576-78
(2d. Cir.)(where market declined by 11% after disclosure, finding that stock was over-
valued by 52.2% would not stand), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Note, The Fraud on
the Market Theory: Efficient Markets and the Defenses to an Implied 10b-5 Action, 70
Iowa L. Rev. 975, 985, 991-92 (1985)(if misrepresentation is material, there will be effect
on market price after disclosure).
A fraud that has no effect on market prices is presumably immaterial. This application
of the materiality standard reflects the courts' general tendency to consider the market
price of a publicly traded security as the best indication of its value. See, e.g., In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex 1980)(investors rely on the market to evaluate
information for them); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 517
F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir.)(exchange price is most accurate measure of fair market value), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247-48
(7th Cir.)(when market value is available and reliable, other factors should not be used),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
17. While the elements of a Rule lOb-5 action are derived from common-law fraud,
they are not co-extensive with their common-law predecessors and courts have variously
interpreted them to achieve the overriding purpose of disclosure and enforcement of fed-
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lent activity to his detriment. The reliance element establishes the neces-
sary link between defendant's wrongdoing and plaintiff's injury.18
Recent court decisions accepting the application of the fraud-on-the-
market theory19 have made easier the plaintiff's burden of proving sub-
jective reliance on the misinformation. The theory posits that in open
and developed markets, the price of a security efficiently incorporates all
available material information regarding the security- a form of the effi-
cient market hypothesis 2 -and that, accordingly, material misinforma-
tion distorts the market equilibrium and defrauds purchasers even if they
do not actually and specifically rely on the misstatements.2 The fraud-
on-the-market theory creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance in
transactions involving securities that are actively traded in well-devel-
eral securities laws. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975)(citing
cases), cert. denied 429 U.S. 816 (1976); see also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F.Supp 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946)(creating a private right of action under Rule lOb-5
traceable to tort principles); Comment, supra note 2, at 278 (private right of action rooted
in common-law deceit); M.Kaufman, Securities Lit: Damages, § 5-04 (1989)(discussing
Rule lOb-5 damages under tort model).
18. See Cobine, supra note 10, at 656. As the Supreme Court has indicated, however,
reliance should not be equated with causation. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
251 (1988)(White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
19. See e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-45 (summarizing the fraud-on-the-market theory
and sustaining the presumption of reliance); Blackie, 524 F.2d at 907 (first decision
adopting the theory).
20. See infra note 21.
21. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-42.
Three major premises underly the fraud-on-the-market theory. See Note, supra note
16, at 978-80. The first is the "efficient market hypothesis" ("EMH"), which, in its
"semi-strong" form, posits that the market price of a stock does in fact accurately and
efficiently reflect all available public information, true or false, about a company. See J.
Cohen, E. Zinbarg, & A. Zeikel, Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management 145-52
(5th ed. 1987); see also Note, supra note 16, at 978 (all available information reflected in
market price). But see Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19
U. C. Davis L. Rev. 341 passim (1986)(presenting considerable data and "anomalies"
demonstrating that the stock markets may not in fact be efficient). The Supreme Court in
Basic implicitly accepted the "semi-strong" form of the efficient-market hypothesis. See
Macey & Miller, Good Finance Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1077-78 (1990); see also Fama, Efficient Capital Marke-
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383 (1970)(first suggesting the
now-accepted trichotomy of the EMH into strong, semi-strong, and weak forms). The
"weak form" of EMH holds that current stock prices reflect only the information in
historical market prices. The "semi-strong form" goes further and posits that stock
prices also rapidly incorporate all publicly available information. The "strong form"
holds that stock prices fully reflect most privately held information as well. See J. Cohen,
E. Zinbarg, & A. Zeikel, at 145.
The second major premise of the fraud-on-the-market theory is the "market model of
investment decision making, which holds that individual investors do not need personal
access to information to make sound investment decisions. The third premise, and per-
haps the most important for purposes of financial analysis, is that damages stemming
from fraud or misrepresentation can be quantified. See Note, supra note 16, at 978-79.
Cf Comment, supra note 2, at 277-78, 283-84 (discussing assumptions behind fraud-on-
the-market theory).
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oped and efficient markets.22
Recent studies indicate that the concept of market efficiency, a major
premise of the fraud-on-the-market theory, is a relative one.23 These
studies suggest that there are degrees of efficiency in securities markets,
and that efficiency is affected by a number of variables, including the type
of information being assimilated, the market in which the security is be-
ing traded and the type of security being traded.24 These studies imply
that, for the purposes of damages analysis, calculations should be based
not on whether the market was efficient or inefficient, but rather on
whether the fraud was sufficiently material to have a statistically signifi-
cant impact on the market price, given the degree of market efficiency.
Closely connected to the element of reliance, the element of causation
limits plaintiff's damages to those actually caused by defendant's fraudu-
lent activity.25 When the foregoing Rule lOb-5 elements are proved, to-
gether with -misrepresentation and intent, reliance will ordinarily
establish the nexus necessary to establish causation. 26 Most important
22. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47.
The presumption may be rebutted by attacking the proof of the elements giving rise to
the presumption. A defendant, for example, may show that the misinformation did not
distort the market price of the stock, or that the plaintiff would have traded the security
despite his knowledge that the information was false. See id. at 248-49.
The presumption of reliance promotes general goals of fairness and public policy ap-
plying to Rule lOb-5. See id., at 245. It relieves plaintiffs of a difficult evidentiary burden
and advances Congressional policy by facilitating an investor's reliance on the integrity of
the securities markets. See id. at 245-46. The presumption also greatly facilitates class
certification in Rule lOb-5 litigation. By focusing on class members' common reliance on
the integrity of the market, rather than on each individual's reliance on defendant's mis-
representation, courts can more easily find that common questions predominate over in-
dividual questions, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) and (b)(3).
See id. at 242.
23. See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 1086 (listing variables affecting efficiency);
see also Ho & Michaely, Information Quality and Market Efficiency, 23 J. Fin & Quant.
Anal. 53, 53 (1988)(market efficiency should vary according to a cost-benefit analysis
weighing costs of processing information against prospective returns); Heinkel & Kraus,
Measuring Event Impacts in Thinly Traded Stocks, 23 J. Fin & Quant. Anal. 71, 86
(1988)(suggesting empirical method for measuring impact of firm-specific events on the
prices of thinly traded stocks); Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 556-57 (1984)(proposing concept of "relative efficiency" and
suggesting that different kinds of information are reflected with varying degrees of market
efficiency).
24. See infra notes 21 & 23.
25. See Cobine, supra note 10, at 656.
26. See Basic, at 243 ("Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.").
If one adopts the fraud-on-the-market theory and the efficient-market hypothesis, it
follows that a material omission or misrepresentation, one that distorts the market-equi-
librium price, causes an injury to any investor who trades in the security relying solely on
the general integrity and efficiency of the market. See Note, supra note 1, at 472-73. This
"pure causation" approach focuses inquiry on whether the fraudulent act in fact had a
distorting effect on the security's market price. If the nexus between the misinformation
and the stock-price distortion can be demonstrated, causation is established. See id. at
467. This approach contrasts with traditional notions of "loss causation" and "transac-
tion causation," inherited from common-law fraud. These may be deemed subjective in
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for purposes of damages analysis, the connected elements of materiality,
reliance and causation require that damages calculations under Rule lOb-
5 exclude the effects of market fluctuations unrelated to the fraud or mis-
representation.27 Plaintiff must always prove a residual market effect
stemming solely from the fraud for damages to be awarded.'e
B. Theories of Damages in Rule 10b-5 CASES
Courts award only actual damages for Rule 10b-5 violations. 29 Be-
cause federal securities laws are to be construed flexibly, however, in or-
der to accomplish their remedial purpose, courts may fashion any
remedy or accept any measure of damages to make good the wrong."
The burden generally remains on the plaintiff to prove damages.3"
The basic measure of damages in Rule lOb-5 litigation is the "out-of-
pocket," or injury, measure.3 2 The out-of-pocket measure looks to the
plaintiff's loss. For a defrauded buyer, this measure of recovery is the
that they focus on establishing a factual chain of causation between the fraudulent act
and the investor's decision to transact and consequent harm. See id. at 469-71; see also
Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the
Remedy to the Wrong, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 471-72 (1988)(transaction causation analyzes
whether, but for the fraud, plaintiff would have entered into transaction; loss causation
focuses on relationship between fraud and damages).
27. The causal nexus is also broken, for example, by applying principles of mitigation.
Damages cannot be recovered for losses incurred beyond a reasonable time, after which
the plaintiff no longer relies on the misrepresentation, has a chance to make a "second
investment decision," or should know of the fraud. See Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon &
Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978); Foster v. Financial Technology, Inc., 517 F.2d
1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1975). For purposes of damages calculations, this restriction sets a
limit on the class period of securities purchases and sales that will be entitled to damages.
28. See, e.g., Note, supra note 1, at 467-69 (outlining means for proving and disprov-
ing causal nexus); Reder, supra note 4, at 1846-50 (discussing causation and intervening
factors).
29. See § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)(applying § 28 to determine the
"correct measure of damages"); Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981); Green
v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 303 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); 5C A.
Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, § 260.03(a), 11-17 to 11-20 (2d rev. ed.
1990).
30. See, e.g., Pelletier v. Stuart-James Co., 863 F.2d 1550, 1558-59 (11th Cir.
1989)(court's function is to fashion remedy best suited to harm)(quoting Garnatz v. Sti-
fel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977)); Arrington v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1981)(same); Nye v. Blyth
Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1198 (8th Cir. 1978)(same).
31. See Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
822 (1983). But see Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 913-17 (analyzing how courts
allocate burden of proof between plaintiff and defendant).
32. See Affiliated Ute Citzens, 406 U.S. at 155; see also Note, supra note 7, at 383-84 (
"If anything is currently the rule of damages under lOb-5, it is the out-of-pocket
award."); Note, supra note 4, at 844-50 (comparing out-of-pocket measure with proxi-
mate cause measure); Mullaney, supra note 5, at 281 ("basic rule on damages for a de-
frauded purchaser under rule lob-5 ... is the 'out-of-pocket' rule").
Some cases may warrant alternative measures of damages. Courts have at times em-
ployed a benefit-of-the-bargain theory for measuring actual damages. See Osofsky, 645
F.2d at 111-14; Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 596 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (S.D.N.Y.
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difference on the date of purchase between the price paid for the stock
and its "true value."3 3 For a defrauded seller, the recovery is the differ-
ence between the true value of the security sold and the price received at
the time of the sale.34 Generally, the date for valuation of the loss is the
date of the transaction in question.35 While damages should be measured
as of the transaction date, subsequent events may provide useful informa-
tion for measuring the damages.36
As a measure of net economic loss, the out-of-pocket measure excludes
losses unrelated to the fraud, notably those pertaining to general market
or economic forces or non-fraudulent, company-specific events.37 Re-
moving non-fraud factors generally requires the analysis of an expert,
1984). But see Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975)(specifi-
cally rejecting benefit-of-bargain measure), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
Defrauded plaintiffs may also seek rescission as an alternative to damages, particularly
when privity exists. See generally, Thompson, The Measure of Damages Under Rule 10b-
5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort Damages, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 349, 365-81 (1984)(dis-
cussing restitution and rescission under Rule lOb-5); Matheson, Corporate Disclosure Ob-
ligations and the Parameters of Rule lOb-5: Basic Inc. v. Levinson and Beyond, 14 J.
Corp. Law 1, 31 & n.212 (1988)(citing cases accepting and rejecting this measure).
33. The "true value" is the price at which the stock would have traded absent the
fraud.
34. See Arrington v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 651 F.2d 615, 621 (9th
Cir. 1981); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 908-09 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S.
816 (1976); 5C A. Jacobs, supra note 29, § 260.03(c)(ii) at 11-34; see also Estate Counsel-
ing Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1962)(out-of-pocket measure is "the difference between the contract price, or the price
paid, and the real or actual value at the date of the sale, together with such outlays as are
attributable to the defendant's conduct").
35. See 5C A. Jacobs, supra note 29, § 260.03(c)(ii) at 11-35-37 n.12 (citing cases).
36. See 5C A. Jacobs, supra note 29, § 260.03(c)(ii) at 11-37 to 11-38; M. Kaufman,
Securities Lit: Damages, § 9:43 (1989). Cf. Harris, 523 F.2d at 226 (market value mea-
sured as of date of discovery of the fraud).
Because the investor is presumed to have assumed the risk of general market fluctua-
tions and can be compensated only for losses proximately caused by the fraud, the out-of-
pocket measure excludes losses arising from subsequent events unrelated to the fraud.
See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 190 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S.
938 (1982)(compensate only for damages "directly resulting from the appellant's wrong-
ful acts"); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
Some courts have applied a modified out-of-pocket measure where it is difficult to mea-
sure the true value of the security at the time of the transaction. These courts look to the
value measured on some date later than the transaction date, such as the date of public
discovery of the fraud or the date when the plaintiff discovered or should have discovered
the fraud. See, eg., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 180 n.24 (8th Cir. 1982)(plain-
tiff's discovery); Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 68 (8th Cir.
1980)(public discovery), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981); Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon
& Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1200 (8th cir. 1978)(plaintiff's discovery); Harris, 523 F.2d at 226
(public discovery).
This measure, however, has been criticized because it may create a windfall recovery
to the plaintiff in contravention of the compensatory aim of Rule lob-5. See Bonime v.
Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
37. See Merritt, supra note 26, at 471-84 (comparing gross loss and net loss measures
of damages); Note, supra note 4, at 838-41 & 841 n.17 (reviewing the net loss measure).
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whose testimony is admitted to demonstrate the actual value of a security
on the date of the challenged transaction.38
II. PER-SHARE CALCULATION OF DAMAGES IN lOb-5 ACTIONS
The most common procedure used by courts and practitioners to de-
termine damages for each share affected by fraud or misrepresentation
("per-share damages") applies a "value-line" framework.39 This proce-
dure is based on widely accepted financial and market theories and as-
sumes the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory.
In the value-line approach, actual market prices of the security are
placed along a "price line" for the period affected by the fraud. These
are matched with the values of the security absent the fraud, or the true
values, which are calculated for each day during the period affected by
the fraud and placed on a "value line." The difference between the two
values represents the affect of the fraud, and thus the estimated damages,
during the period (hereinafter referred to herein as the "class period").
Chart 1 illustrates this approach in the case of a simple fraud, where a
single misrepresentation inflates the price of the stock' by a constant
amount during the class period and is corrected by a single disclosure.
The price line and value line meet at the point where disclosure "cures"
the fraud, or more specifically, at the point where the fraud has zero
effect on the market price.
It is important that any damages model eliminate all factors affecting
stock price other than the fraud, because plaintiffs are entitled to com-
pensation only for the "residual" price effect attributable only to the
fraud.41 To calculate this residual impact, the effects of at least three
major factors that influence stock price must be identified and removed:
(i) economy-wide information; (ii) industry information; and (iii) firm-
specific information not related to the fraud.42
38. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 576-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 838 (1982); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 744
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer
Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 787-90 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The expert's testimony must set out
actual dollar values for the true value of the securities affected by the fraud. See Beis-
singer, 529 F. Supp. at 790.
39. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-44 (9th Cir.
1976)(Sneed, J., concurring)(Judge Sneed's oft-cited outline of basic value-line and price-
line procedure); Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 885-86; Note, supra note 4, at 858-70;
Note, supra note 7, at 383-98.
40. A misrepresentation can also cause a stock to be artificially deflated, as in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 976 (1969),
which involved false information about a mineral ore discovery. The analysis is similar.
For the sake of simplicity, the examples used throughout this Note involve misinforma-
tion that artificially inflates the stock price.
41. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases. 52 U. Chi. L
Rev. 611, 627 (1985); Note, supra note 4, at 867-68; Note, supra note 7, at 386.
42. See Beaver & Malernee, Estimating Damages in Securities Fraud Cases 1 (Cor-
nerstone Research, Cambridge, MA)(private publication)(available at Fordham Law Re-
view); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 627-28; see also Cornell & Morgan, supra
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Chart 1
Value Line Approach for Simple Fraud
Dollars
Market Date of
Price Corrective
Disclosure
Sue
Value
Fraud begins Time
One method for constructing the value line is the use of the "market
model" of financial theory, a model based on the capital asset pricing
model ("CAPM").43 The market model uses a linear- or multiple-regres-
sion analysis that tracks the effect of non-fraud factors on market price to
calculate the price of the stock absent the fraud on the value line. This
analysis, sometimes referred to as the "comparable-index approach,""
estimates the true value of the subject security based on the historical
relation of the security's market prices to one or more indices of market
or industry behavior.
note 1, at 888, 903 (pointing out that comparable-index approach inadequately accounts
for company-specific information); Reder, supra note 4, at 1847-50 (treating other factors
as "intervening" factors that break causal link between fraud and plaintiff's injury).
43. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 886-88; Fischel, supra note 1, at 17-19, 17
n.45; Note, supra note 4, at 858-69; Note, supra note 7, at 386-89. For general discussion
of the underpinnings and use of CAPM and the market model, see Schwert, Using Finan-
cial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J. L. & Econ. 121 (1981); Myers &
Turnbull, Capital Budgeting and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Good News and Bad
News, 32 J. Fin. 321 (1977); Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilib-
rium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. Fin. 425 (1964); Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.
Fin. 77 (1952).
44. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 897-98; Note, supra note 4, at 859-67;
Note, supra note 7, at 397-98. A chart illustrating this approach appears in Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 129-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(awarding damages
based on this formula, but amending the award on other grounds), modified, 635 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1980). For a detailed discussion of the use of multiple regression analysis in
a related context, see Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 Colum. L. Rev.
702, 702-21, 726-29 (1980).
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The comparable-index approach uses a formula that accounts for mar-
ket-price movement during a given period as the sum of market-related
and industry-related factors.45 The following equation is employed: r =
a + bRm + cRx + e, where "r" is the total return on the stock, "a" (or
"alpha") is the firm-specific constant representing the average total re-
turn not captured by "Rm" and "Rx", "bRm" is the company-market
relation "b" (or "beta") multiplied by the market return "Rm", "cRx" is
the company-industry relation "c" times the industry return, and "e" is
the unexplained change in the price of the stock attributed to unsys-
tematic firm-specific factors. As the formula indicates, "Rm" and "Rx"
are explanatory variables, while "b" and "c" are numerical estimates of
the partial relationships between "r" and "Rm" and "Rx". In practice,
"e" (the error of the regression) is often assumed to have a mean of zero
and is disregarded in the summation."
The procedure for calculating the residual impact of fraud on market
prices may be reduced to the following steps:
47
1. Determine the period of the suspected fraud (the class period).
2. Assemble data for the class period regarding the price of the stock,
the market and any relevant industry group. Assemble this data as well
for a period where the price of the stock was determined in the absence of
fraud, for example just prior to the class period. This is the "control" or
"clean" period. There should be enough observations in this period to
permit the calculation of statistically valid estimates of the coefficients of
"Rm" and "Rx". Typically, an index, such as the S&P 500 or the Wil-
shire Index, serves as a surrogate for overall market performance to cal-
culate market returns. Industry indexes may be constructed by
assembling a group of comparable public companies or by employing
available indexes prepared by financial institutions such as Standard &
Poor's or Value Line.
3. Determine the daily returns on the stock, the market index, and
any industry indexes employed for the class and control periods.
4. Using a regression model, derive returns for the stock (the depen-
dent variable) based on the comparable-index formula. To do this, insert
into the formula the observed returns on the market and the industry
indexes (the independent variables). Use a regression analysis on the
control period to calculate the coefficients "a", "b" and "c". Then use
45. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 627; Cornell & Morgan, supra note
1, at 898.
46. See Fischel, supra note 1, at 18 n.47; Note, supra note 4, at 861-62 & n. 110.
47. In practice, a number of simplifying assumptions are sometimes made. In some
situations, it is assumed that, absent the fraud, the price of the stock would track its
historical relation to the market, so that beta is held constant, and a and c = 0. Alterna-
tively, it is sometimes assumed that the stock price will track industry returns, so that a
and b = 0 and c = 1. Beta is often held constant during the class period at the level that
existed prior to the fraud. See Note, supra note 4, at 859 & n. 104. It is also assumed that
the industry and market indexes collectively represent all systematic factors affecting the
price of the stock. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 898 n.41 & 42.
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control-period values for "a", "b" and "c" and class-period values for
"Rm" and "Rx" to compute "r-true," the estimated returns of the stock
during the class period assuming the relationship in the control period
between "Rm," "Rx" and "r".
A number of brokerage and other firms, such as Value Line and Mer-
rill Lynch, calculate and publish the company-market coefficient, or
"beta",48 for many companies. These published betas do not factor in
industry or firm specific effects, but may be used in a simple CAPM
model to calculate a rough approximation of true stock returns.
5. Construct a value line backwards from the date when the market
price of the stock fully reflects disclosure of the fraud, using the predicted
returns to derive true values for the stock on a daily basis.49 In other
words, use the stock returns calculated using the comparable-index
formula, "r-true", to calculate the stock price in the absence of fraud.
The "event-study approach," an alternative to the "comparable-index
approach," may more accurately reflect the impact of company-specific
information. This approach assumes that the price and value of the se-
curity move in tandem except during days when disclosures of fraudulent
activity influence the price of the stock.50 This approach also uses a re-
gression analysis. Using "dummy variables", one tries to identify the sta-
tistically significant abnormal returns due to the fraud. Here, one
estimates "a", "b", and "c" over some combination of both the class and
control periods. One also estimates "d", the direct effect on "r" of the
disclosure of the fraud.
The calculation of damages both by the comparable-index approach
and the event-study approach is subject to a number of limitations and
complications. Some of these are implicit in the simplifying assumptions
that underlie the models5 and further refinements of each model may
ameliorate them. Other problems require additional financial analysis
and point to the fact that there are subjective or speculative components
in the calculation of damages. 2 Some of the problems faced in adapting
the damages models to a specific fact pattern include:
1. Estimating the "beta"'53 coefficient: The comparable-index ap-
proach assumes that a particular calculation of historical beta (during the
48. See infra note 53.
49. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 889. Theoretically, the value line could
also be calculated by running the regression analysis forward from a date before the fraud
affected the market price. The two lines may differ owing to discrepancies between actual
returns and predicted returns resulting from firm-specific events unrelated to the fraud
and its disclosure. If the fraud changed the nature of the firm (or covered up the existence
of such a change), you may get substantial differences from using the before-class-period
"a,b,c" as compared to the after-class-period "a,b,c" to calculate "r-true". Which is
right? Probably neither but rather some combination of both.
50. See Cornell & Morgan, supra Note 1, at 899.
51. See infra note 47.
52. See id. at 900-911; Note, supra note 4, at 867-68; Note, supra note 7, at 393-95.
53. Beta measures the return on the stock associated with the market return. See J.
Cohen, E. Zinbarg & A. Zeikel, supra note 21, at 140-41, 156-57.
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control period) remains constant throughout the class period. Yet beta
calculations may vary by a considerable margin depending on the
method of calculation and the control periods used for measurement.'
A stock's beta may also change over time. During a prolonged class pe-
riod, particularly when other major changes in company operations ac-
company the fraud, the beta may change suddenly and by a significant
amount,5" so that the historical beta used in the comparable-index ap-
proach is a practical oversimplification.
2. Estimating the "alpha" variable: Per-share damages calculations
often fail to consider the "alpha" component of stock market return, or
the return of the stock independent of its sensitivity to market and indus-
try forces. 6 The development of CAPM in connection with diversified-
portfolio analysis suggests that the aggregate alpha of a diversified port-
folio may approach zero.57 Therefore damages calculations may some-
times also assume a zero-level alpha. If there is a zero-level alpha, the
alpha component would have no effect on the damages calculation. The
alpha component, however, can be a much larger factor in analyzing the
returns of a particular stock, as in securities litigation damages
calculations.
3. Leakages of information involving disclosure of the fraud: If all the
information about the fraud is revealed at the same time, then the change
in the price of the stock at the time of disclosure, less the change in the
market and industry factors, is reasonably attributed to the fraud unless,
of course, there is simultaneously another major factor affecting the
stock's price. If, on the other hand, disclosures seep out over an ex-
tended period, it is more difficult to determine when corrective disclo-
sures occur5" and the impact of such disclosures on the market. In
addition, there is a greater likelihood over a long time period that inter-
vening market, industry, and company-specific factors will distort the
analysis.59 If the event-study approach is used, a value line that substi-
tutes predicted returns in place of actual returns only on dates of known
disclosures will understate true damages.'"
A related problem is determining whether the market has in fact been
fooled by the fraud or whether the information has in some other way
credibly entered the market. As the Court emphasized in Basic, defend-
ants are only liable for misrepresentations that in fact influence the mar-
ket price.6'
54. See id. at 140-41, 156-62.
55. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 628.
56. For a description of the alpha component and its relation to CAPM, see J. Cohen,
E. Zinbarg & A. Zeikel, supra note 21, at 136-43.
57. See id at 142.
58. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 891-92; Note, supra note 7, at 394-95.
59. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, at 626-27.
60. Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 903.
61. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988); see also In re Apple Sec.
Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989)(misrepresentation credibly entered market by
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4. Attributing the effects of multiple interrelated misrepresentations:
A fraud may consist of a series of misrepresentations, so that the mix of
information available to investors varies during the class period. This
may not inhibit plaintiff class certification where there is a continual, un-
changing scheme of fraud throughout the class period.62 In other in-
stances, there may be discrete but related frauds involving the same stock
but different defendants. For example, a company may misrepresent its
financial statements and also issue related misstatements regarding the
status of a company project. The plaintiff may include the company's
accountants as defendant in one fraud but not the other. Subsequent
disclosures may partially cure one fraud without curing the other. In
such situations, it may be difficult or impossible to disentangle damages
or create separate value lines, and thus financial theory may not aid the
apportionment of damages.63
5. A lack of direct correlation between the initialfraud and subsequent
disclosures: Frequently, frauds are cured by corrective statements that
also contain additional information, leading to problems of "over-disclo-
sure" and "under-disclosure." '  It does not follow then that the market's
reaction to a curative statement is attributable purely to fraud-related
information. Cornell and Morgan provide an example of over-disclosure
taken from Basic,6" where a denial of merger talks was corrected by dis-
closure of an actual transaction. As Cornell and Morgan suggest, one
solution to this problem is the determination of an "equivalent disclo-
sure" price, the price at which the security would have traded at the
beginning of the class period if the fraudulent information alone had been
disclosed. The authors nonetheless concede that this calculation is diffi-
cult to support with objective analysis.66
6. Defining the efficiency of the market: As discussed earlier,67 the
efficiency of the market for different securities may vary widely and de-
pends largely on the cost and difficulty of processing new information.68
The analyst's determination of the degree of market efficiency affects his
assessment of both the accuracy and the timing of the market's reaction
means other than defendant's disclosure), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990); In re Con-
vergent Technologies Sec. Litig., 721 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 1988)(same); Cor-
nell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 919 (whether fraud has been cured by third party
information is key factual issue in rebutting fraud-on-the market claims); Macey &
Miller, supra note 21, at 1087-89 (quoting Basic but expressing doubt about court's ability
to determine whether market fooled or not).
62. See Harman v. Lymphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1988)(discuss-
ing impact of multiple misrepresentation on materiality and class certification)(citing
cases).
63. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 907-09.
64. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 889-94. This article also analyzes some of
the other problems with using the market model to calculate damages. See id. at 900-11.
65. See id. at 894-97.
66. See id.
67. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
68. See Note, supra note 7, at 387-88, 394-95.
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to corrective information.6 9 Assume a company whose stock is trading
at $100 makes a corrective disclosure at the start of trading on Monday.
At the end of the day, the stock closes at $75. Over the next four days,
the market price continues to drop, and on Friday the stock closes at
$65. On what day did the market fully assimilate the new information?
If the stock is thinly traded, how reliable is the market price as a measure
of the market reaction to the new information? These determinations
will establish the cut-off date and the possible margin of error for calcu-
lating damages.
7. Accounting for non-fraud-related company-specific events:" Per-
haps the greatest challenge faced by financial analysts in applying a mar-
ket model to compute damages is distinguishing between fraud-related
and non-fraud-related factors. The comparable-index approach predicts
the return on a security based on market and industry returns, but does
not separately account for the effects on returns of company-specific
events, such as an acquisition that occurs during the class period.7"
These events may have significant impact on stock returns, particularly
during a fraud of long duration. Use of the event-study approach does
not entirely solve this problem. The event-study approach also uses pre-
dicted returns on trading days affected by fraud disclosures, even though
significant non-fraud company information may also be revealed on these
days. Performing a micro-analysis of trading patterns to try to correlate
abrupt and abnormal price movements with a carefully prepared time-
line of public information releases may provide a partial solution. The
market reaction to certain significant company events, such as the an-
nouncement of an acquisition, is often almost instantaneous.72 This anal-
ysis, however, obviously injects another subjective component into the
calculation of damages.
8. Accounting for the effects of information not required to be dis-
closed: This problem has been raised in the context of preliminary
merger discussions, where insiders may have no fiduciary duty to disclose
and where "strategic misrepresentations" arguably protect the interests
of the corporation.73 In such instances, perhaps there should be no liabil-
ity for damages at all.7 Even if the courts accepted the validity of strate-
69. See infra notes 21 & 23 and accompanying text.
70. See generally Note, supra note 4, at 867-68 (discussing this problem).
71. See Note, supra note 7, at 393-94 (acknowleging that the comparable index ap-
proach "is incapable of allocating separate values to separate bits of information released
within the same time period" as the fraud).
72. See infra notes 21 & 23 and accompanying text.
73. Cf Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 1063-76 (discussing fraud-on-the-market
theory and property rights in information).
74. Cf. Basic Inc. v Levinson, 485 U.S. at 232-41 (declining judgment whether secrecy
maximizes shareholder wealth but rejecting agreement-in-principle test for merger discus-
sion disclosure and finding liability if any material misrepresentation); Flamm v. Eber-
stadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1180 (7th Cir.)(no damages awarded because company not required
to disclose merger discussions until price and structure of deal determined), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 853 (1987).
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gic misrepresentations, however, it would still be difficult to analyze the
effects of a corporate statement that combines misinformation requiring
disclosure with other misinformation allegedly entitled to corporate se-
crecy. An "equivalent-disclosure" analysis such as the one discussed
above might provide the only means to separate out the effects of these
two pieces of information on market price.
9. Prolonged periods offraud: The problems introduced by frauds of
long duration have already been discussed in the context of information
leakages and intervening company-specific events.7 Prolonged frauds
merit separate mention here because additional problems relating to such
frauds arise in estimating aggregate damages. Moreover, prolonged
frauds introduce market variables that may affect the way the market
reacts to the fraud itself and to disclosures during the class period. 6
The following procedures may mitigate at least some of these
problems: a careful combination of the comparable-index and event-
study approaches;" an analysis of the market effects of an "equivalent
disclosure," namely the disclosure of only the omitted or misrepresented
information required to be disclosed;78 and thorough factual analysis.
Ultimately, the market-model approach remains a useful procedure for
measuring damages in connection with many securities transactions. Be-
cause the damages calculation need only be an estimate, however, an in-
dication of the reliability of the estimate might aid courts and litigators
to make more informed damages assessments. The indication of reliabil-
ity would include a margin of error reflecting degrees of market efficiency
and the inexactitude involved in measuring the impact of other factors on
the stock's price.7 9
III. CALCULATING AGGREGATE DAMAGES IN RULE lOb-5 CLASS-
ACTION LITIGATION
A. The Variables in Aggregate Damages Computation
The general procedure described below provides a means for establish-
ing an estimate of aggregate class-wide damages ° for purposes of settle-
ment rather than proof of damages to a mathematical certainty. This is
75. See infra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text.
76. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 n.25 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429
U.S. 816 (1976); Reder, supra note 4, at 1850; see also Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1976)(discussing market variable affecting
fraud).
77. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 1, at 900-11.
78. See id. at 894-97.
79. See Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(approving settle-
ment based on expert's range of potential recovery), aff'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
80. It is well established that damages may be proven as a threshold matter on a class-
wide basis. See Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 576-77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); In re Texas Int'l Sec. Litig., 114 F.R.D. 33, 43 (W.D. Okla.
1987).
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in line with established precedent articulating the standard of proof that
courts require when Rule 10b-5 cases go to trial.8 '
The calculation of aggregate damages during a class period introduces
new variables into the market-model approach and amplifies the effect of
certain factors in the per-share calculation. The new variables are intro-
duced primarily to determine the number shares affected by the fraud.
The final estimation of damages also depends on matters related to the
claims process itself.82
Four major factors affect the estimation of the number of shares in the
class: (1) the duration of the class period; (2) the size of the initial
"float"; (3) the daily trading volumes;83 and (4) the pattern of trading,
or turnover of shares, during the class period. That not all shares bought
in the period are held to the end of the period, but are re-traded during
the period, complicates the determination of the number of shares af-
fected by the fraud. While these so-called "in-and-out" traders may be
entitled to damages under certain circumstances, their losses are gener-
ally much less than if they had held the shares until the fraud was
corrected.8
The major variables in the formula for calculating aggregate damages
are discussed and analyzed below in the context of an overall model for
estimating total class-wide damages.
1. Duration of the class period: The duration of the class period
(which may or may not be the same as the duration of the fraud), is one
of the most critical factors in establishing aggregate damages. The longer
the class period, the greater the opportunity for market transactions to
occur that will be affected by the fraud and thus be subject to damages.
81. As a rule, when there is sufficient evidence of damages presented at trial, proof of
these damages to a mathematical certainty is unnecessary; an intelligent estimate of dam-
ages is acceptable. See, e.g., Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 891, 895 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); see also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
516 F.2d 172, 189-90 (2d Cir. 1975)(inherent uncertainties in computing price will be
resolved against defendant for purposes of determining damages), rev'd, 430 U.S. 1
(1977); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 587 (E.D.N.Y.
1971)(damages computed by comparing market price paid with value on day of sale).
On the other hand, federal courts have declined to award damages to defrauded private
parties where losses are too speculative. See Pelletier v. Stuart James Co., 863 F.2d 1550,
1557-58 (11th Cir. 1989); In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 973-74
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1986); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,
328 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. See generally Heitz, Kolber, & Schink, Settlement of Security Class Actions, in
Securities Litigation - Prosecution and Defense Strategies 523-49 (Practicing Law Insti-
tute 1985) [hereinafter "PLI Securities Litigation"] (outlining details of claims settlement
process); Fischel, The Use of Economics in Securities Fraud Cases, in PLI Securities Liti-
gation, supra, at 468-69 (other step required to calculate damages is estimation of number
of shares in class).
83. See, eg., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y.
1978)(accepting estimate based on daily volume of shares sold during one-week class pe-
riod); Fischel, supra note 82, at 468-69 (noting limitations in using trading volume alone).
84. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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In a simple fraud, the class period will extend from the date of the initial
misrepresentation until the date of disclosure, or until the market has
fully assimilated the curative information. As noted earlier,85 however, a
series of misrepresentations and multiple disclosures that only partially
cure the fraud or contain significant additional information may compli-
cate the fraud. Appropriate delineation of the class period may require
factual and legal inquiries by both lawyers and financial experts, as well
as analyses of market responses to information.
2. Float: Float is a measure of the number of shares of a publicly
traded corporation that are both issued and outstanding, and assumed
likely to trade in the market with some degree of probability. 6 The con-
cept recognizes that in any given corporation, certain shares will typi-
cally not participate in the trading market over certain periods of time.
In other words, these shares will have a zero probability of trading dur-
ing the class period.87 Because a Rule lOb-5 action concerns only share-
holders who have bought or sold a security,88 shares excluded from the
float will not be affected by the fraud for purposes of Rule lOb-5
litigation.89
Determining the float helps separate out the shares that were bought
during the class period and retained until the end of the period from
those shares disposed of before the fraud was disclosed. Such a distinc-
tion is particularly important during frauds of long duration.
Since buyers and sellers are recorded in the daily records of the major
exchanges, it is theoretically possible to ascertain which shares actually
traded during the class period by studying the records of transfer
agents.90 In Rule lOb-5 actions involving large companies whose shares
trade daily in large volumes, and where the class period extends for many
days, analysis of transfer agents' records may not be feasible. Moreover,
such records are typically incomplete because some securities are held
and traded in "street name"-in the name of a broker or another nomi-
nee instead of the customer-or through other depository institutions
that obscure the identity of the individual security owner.9'
Float may instead be estimated by determining the groups of shares
that are known to be off the market or to have little probability of trad-
ing.92 By determining the number of shares insiders held before and after
85. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
86. See J. Downes & J. Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 140
(2d ed. 1987).
87. See Beaver & Malernee, supra note 42, at 11.
88. See Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
89. See infra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(expert used
records of transfer agent to estimate money paid by short-term traders), aff'd 556 F.2d
554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
91. See Beaver & Malernee, supra note 42, at 10.
92. See infra notes 86 & 87.
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the class period (through referral to SEC filings93 and other public data),
one may frequently eliminate insider shares from the float. In addition,
insiders are often excluded from the class in the plaintiff's complaint.
During any particular class period, one may also determine that other
shares are non-trading. For example, it is reasonable to infer that hold-
ers who have made a Form 13D 91 filing indicating a shareholding greater
than 5% of the class of stock outstanding, and who have filed no amend-
ment to their 13D, have abstained from the market during the class pe-
riod. Certain large blocks of stock, such as those held by institutions,
may also sometimes be eliminated from the float. In other circum-
stances, it may be possible to estimate the degree to which these large
block holdings are available for trading.9"
Two general concepts that relate the float to damages will be demon-
strated below: (i) the float establishes the maximum number of shares
that may be estimated to be affected by the fraud; and (ii) a higher esti-
mate of float will also generally lead to a higher aggregate-damages
estimate.96
The float also impacts damages because it is a variable affecting the
efficiency of the market. The cost of processing information about firms
with only a small float is high relative to potential benefits. Therefore,
markets for these firms will be less efficient,97 and as a result, damages
estimates will contain a higher degree of variance.
3. Stock volume: Daily stock volumes indicate the total number of
shares transacted during the class period that may be affected by the
fraud. Generally, higher daily stock volumes will increase the level of
aggregate damages. Together with the float, the trading volumes are
used to calculate the stock turnover and to estimate shares retained,
rather than re-traded, during the class period.98
93. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C §§ 78a et seq. (1982).
94. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(d), 15 U.S.C §§ 78a et seq. (1982).
95. A recent study of pension funds, for example, indicated that these institutions,
which held 19% of equity securities in 1980 and are expected to own almost 50% in the
year 2000, had annual stock turnovers of between 33% and 84% during the years 1977
through 1983. See Ippolito & Turner, Turnover, Fees and Pension Plan Performance, Fin.
Analysts J., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 16, 19.
96. As a simple illustration of these two concepts, consider a five-day class period,
during each day of which 200,000 shares were traded, or a total of 1,000,000 shares
during the class period. (The relative size of volume and float numbers in this example
are obviously exaggerated for the purposes of illustration.) If the float is 400,000 shares,
the maximum shares bought and retained until the end of the period is 400,000. If the
float is 1,000,000 shares, the maximum shares affected by the fraud is also 1,000,000. Of
course, in each instance a number of shareholders may have sat on the sidelines during
the week and their shares would not be treated in the damages analysis.
Also, higher float leads to a lower probability that any share traded. That, in turn,
means fewer "outs" of the "in-and-out" traders and therefore more of the shares traded
on a given day remain "in" during the class period.
97. See Macey & Miller, supra note 21, at 1086.
98. Cf Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(using trading
volume and transfer agent records to estimate number of short-term traders), aff'd 556
F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert denied 434 U.S. 924 (1977).
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4. Trading Pattern: Trading pattern refers to the identity of buyers
and sellers of a security traded during the class period and to the velocity
of trades among them. This concept aids in distinguishing between
short-term traders who were "in and out" of the stock before the end of
the class period and long-term investors who retained shares until the
end of the period when a corrective disclosure was made.99
Theoretically, an in-and-out trader does not suffer any injury from a
fraud-related market distortion that remains constant during the class
period. Where the fraud has caused inflation, for example, any inflation
that a purchaser suffers would be recovered on the inflated sale within
the class period."° Some courts have questioned whether in some cir-
cumstances in-and-out traders suffer any damages at all.t °0 Courts have
nevertheless generally allowed in-and-out traders to claim damages as
members of a class on the theory that a fraudulent statement may have a
different effect on the price of a security at different times during the class
period depending upon market conditions and other events. This effect
has been described as the "result of market forces operating on the
misrepresentation." 10 2
Even if courts award damages to in-and-out traders, they are likely to
be low relative to losses suffered by those who hold shares until the end
of the period. This is particularly evident in the case of a single correc-
tive disclosure at the end of the class period, in which event the variabil-
ity of the inflation during the class period is typically minimal.10 a
B. Models for Calculating Aggregate Damages
The allocation of damages between the "Ins-and-Outs Damages" of
within-the-class-period traders and "Retention Damages" of those who
purchased the security during the class period and held it until the end of
99. In the case of a class of defrauded sellers, this latter group would consist of those
shareholders who sold stock and did not repurchase before the end of the class period.
100. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Note, supra note 4, at 844-46 (ins-and-
outs damages award reduced by amount recovered on resale); Brodsky, Damages Under
the Securities Laws, N.Y. Law. J., Jan. 6, 1988, at 1, col. 1 (discussing proposition in
context of cases).
101. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., at 745; Bonime, 416 F. Supp. at
1378, 1385 n.8 (approving expert's elimination of in-and-out traders from aggregate dam-
ages estimate based on all shares traded during period).
102. See Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1437 (9th Cir. 1987)(quot-
ing Green v. Occidental Petroleum, 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., con-
curring)); see also Katz v. Comdisco, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Il1.
1987)(recognizing damage theory for in-and-out traders but dismissing plaintiff as class
representative on other grounds).
103. See, e.g., In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. at 745 (plain-
tiffs' expert indicates ins-and-outs represent very small portion of total damages); Green,
541 F.2d at 1345 (decline in market price after purchase by ins-and-outs not attributable
to wrong of defendant if constant price spread); Beaver & Malernee, supra note 42, at 10
(large numbers of ins-and-outs usually lower total damages). But see Green, at 1345-46 &
nn. 6-10 (providing examples where in-and-out traders might suffer significant damages).
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the class period has a major effect on total estimated aggregate damages
of the class."3  The following models provide a method for making this
allocation in the context of estimating overall class-wide damages.
1. The Proportional Trading Model
One model that may be used to calculate Retention Damages may be
termed a Proportional Trading Model (PTM). The PTM assumes that
on any given day, the shares that are sold are drawn uniformly and ran-
domly from all the shares in the float, or, in other words, that any share
in the float is as likely to be traded as any other share. According to this
assumption, a proportional number of shares traded comes from both the
pool of shares that have not been traded since the beginning of the class
period ("Float Retained") and from the pool of shares purchased during
the the class period and still held by those purchasers ("Traded Shares
Retained"). On any day during the class period, the sum of the Float
Retained and the Traded Shares Retained is equal to the total float. For
example, if a given day's trading volume equals one percent of the total
float, the PTM assumes that one percent of Float Retained will trade on
that day, and that one percent of the Traded Shares Retained from each
prior trading day during the class period will trade as well.
The computer analysis based on the PTM calculates how many shares
bought on each day during the class period are retained until the end of
the period. Multiplying these shares by the per-share damages calcula-
tion for each transaction date determines aggregate Retention Damages
on that date. The sum of such daily aggregate damages for the entire
class period provides an initial estimate of total damages. A further ad-
justment factors in the Ins-and-Outs Damages, i.e. any damages, positive
or negative, attributable to shareholders who bought and resold during
the period. The sum of Retention Damages and Ins-and-Outs Damages
equals the total estimated damages of the shareholder class.
Table 1 illustrates this procedure. This table analyzes a hypothetical
fraud over a ten-day class period for XYZ Company. The fraud causes
the price of the stock to be inflated throughout the class period until
corrective disclosure occurs on the tenth day. The key given variables
are that XYZ Company has fifteen million shares outstanding, a beta of
1.25, and constant daily stock volume of 35,000 shares.' 0 5 The key as-
sumption is a float of ten million shares and a proportional number of all
shares in the float trading on any given day. In the example in Table 1,
104. See Bonime, 416 F. Supp. at 1378 (court approval of deduction by expert of 50%
of gross dollar inflation during class period as owing to in-and-out traders).
105. Given the $50 per share market price, XYZ Company has a market capitalization
of $750 million. The relation of stock volume to shares outstanding is similar to compa-
nies trading on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). There are an average of 45
million shares registered per company on the NYSE. The daily stock volume per com-
pany approximates 107,000 shares. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1990, Table Nos. 843 & 845, 512-13
(1990).
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virtually all of the 350,000 shares purchased during the period are re-
tained until the end. This is a typical pattern in frauds involving short
class periods.
2. The Accelerated Trading Model
As some analysts have noted, once a share is traded it may have a
much greater than equal probability of being re-traded during the pe-
riod.106 This seems particularly true in circumstances involving the pos-
sible acquisition of the subject company, when arbitrageurs and other
short-term traders have increased participation in the market. To reflect
this trading pattern, it may be advisable to employ an Accelerated Trad-
ing Model ("ATM").
The ATM modifies the assumption of the source of each day's trading
volume. This model assigns to the shares a proportional likelihood of
having come from either the Float Retained (the shares held prior to the
class period that have not traded during the class period) and the Traded
Shares Retained (the shares that have already been traded at least once
during the class period). This new variable in the ATM may be termed
the "Turnover Likelihood." Turnover Likelihood is the weighted pro-
portional probability that Traded Shares Retained will trade on any
given day relative to the shares in the Float Retained. A Turnover Like-
lihood of 1.Ox, for example, will yield the same results as the PTM:
traded shares are drawn proportionately from among all shares in the
float. A Turnover Likelihood of 5.0x, on the other hand, assumes that on
any given day during the class period, shares in the pool of Traded
Shares Retained are five times more likely to trade as shares in the Float
Retained.
There is no simple method for determining the actual turnover of
shares during a class period. As noted earlier, actual trading data is gen-
erally available to shareholders in the records of the transfer agent, but
because of shares held in "street name" or other depository accounts,
even these records may be incomplete."0 7 While past experience may
lead to certain reasonable assumptions, a comprehensive study of trading
patterns under different market circumstances has not yet been per-
formed. The best method may be to employ a sampling approach based
on information in transfer agent records and to extrapolate a reasonable
estimate of Turnover Likelihood based on the results of this analysis.
The number of shares in the Float Retained will trade in the market,
and therefore be subject to damages, at a slower rate with a higher Turn-
over Likelihood. As a result, total Retention Damages decrease as the
Turnover Likelihood increases. Table 2, which assumes a 5.Ox Turnover
Likelihood, illustrates this effect for the fraud involving XYZ Company.
106. See Beaver & Malernee, supra note 42, at 11 (positing that share is four to five
times more likely to be traded again, but providing no supporting evidence).
107. See infra note 91.
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3. The Impact of Class Duration, Float, Stock Volume and Turnover
Likelihood on Aggregate Damages Estimates
Tables 1 and 2 estimate damages for a hypothetical fraud lasting ten
days, a relatively short duration. Because the class period is brief, the
impact of a greater Turnover Likelihood assumption, indicated in Table
2, is relatively minor. The same holds true for modifications in the as-
sumption about the size of the float: most shares that trade are retained
until the end of the period and are subject to Retention Damages.
Class-action suits brought under Rule 10b-5 involve class periods that
vary widely in duration, and sometimes extend for several years.'08 Be-
cause of space limitations, Tables 3 and 4 analyze the effects of the vari-
ables in the PTM and ATM in a fraud of longer duration by multiplying
daily stock volume to approximate the volumes that would trade over a
more extended period of time. Accordingly, the daily stock volume over
the ten-day period is multiplied by ten so that total trading volume in the
ten-day scenario approximates the volumes that would occur during a
100-day period.
Table 3(a) illustrates the PTM for a simulated 100-day class period,
with other variables held the same as in Table 1. Only 79% of the shares
purchased during the period are held until the end, as compared with
over 98% during the ten-day period. If the inflation per share were con-
stant throughout the period so that Ins-and-Outs Damages were zero,
then aggregate class-wide damages would equal the Retention Damages
(Traded Shares Retained x Inflation Per Share) of the 79% of traded
shares held until the end of the class period.
Table 3(b) demonstrates the impact of increasing the assumed starting
float from ten million shares to fifteen million shares, which is equal to
the total shares outstanding in this example. As indicated therein, the
number of shares retained until the end of the period increases, and thus
so do Retention Damages, as the assumed shares in the float increase.
Tables 4(a) and 4(b) indicate the significant impact of using an ATM
in place of a PTM when a fraud extends over a longer period of time.
Table 4(a) assumes a Turnover Likelihood of 5.0x, or a high degree of
back-and-forth trading of shares during the period. Relative to the com-
parable PTM analysis in Table 3(a), total estimated damages are reduced
108. See, eg., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1172 (7th Cir. 1987)(class period
December 5, 1975 to January 23, 1976); Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 742 (6th
Cir. 1986)(class period October 21, 1977 to December 15, 1978); Sirota v. Solitron De-
vices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 572 (2d Cir. 1982)(fraud from 1967 to 1970); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 556 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and rey'd in part,
459 U.S. 375 (1983)(90-day class period); Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp.
1397, 1399 (D. Corn 1988)(class period February 12, 1986 to September 26, 1986); In re
Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(class period No-
vember 12, 1982 to September 23, 1983); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618
F. Supp. 735, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(class period March 3, 1982 through December 8,
1982); Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770, 775 (F-D. Pa.
1981)(class period July 11, 1971 to June 30, 1972).
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by half, and total Retention Damages (which would equal total damages
if Ins-and-Outs Damages were zero) are reduced by almost two-thirds.
Table 4(b) demonstrates the additional impact on damages when the
float is assumed to equal the shares outstanding, increasing the assumed
float by half.
Chart 1 illustrates the impact of varying assumptions regarding Turno-
ver Likelihood in the ATM for an actual, rather than simulated, 100-day
class period. As the size of actual daily stock volumes increases, the gap
in damages resulting from a high versus low Turnover Likelihood widens
significantly.
This pattern would continue if the chart considered even longer class
periods. As noted earlier, however, the size of the float ultimately limits
total Retention Damages, because this will set an upward limit on the
number of shares that may be subject to the fraud. Chart 2, which as-
sumes fixed variables similar to those presented in Table 1, illustrates
that cumulative Retention Damages will tend to flatten out as the class
period lengthens, given a fixed level of inflation per share.
Courts and commentators considering damages issues under Rule lOb-
5 have tended to focus on the inflation in the per-share market price, that
is, the difference between actual price and true value. 1°9 As Tables I
through 4 indicate, however, total class-wide damages may depend more
significantly on the length of the class period, the probable number of
shares available for trading during the class period, the trading volume
and the trading pattern of shares. In arriving at a lump sum settlement,
where damages may not be procedurally limited to those shares held by
shareholders filing proof of claim, the treatment of these variables re-
quires special consideration.
C. The Claims Process and Estimated Damages
In many instances, members of the plaintiff class are difficult to con-
tact or do not step forward to prove their claims within the requisite time
limits.' 10 Depending on the form of settlement, this may act as a practi-
cal limit on estimated damages. When the litigation extends for a long
period of time beyond the initial fraud, this may aggravate the problem
of notifying claims holders."1
Shareholders may change their addresses so that claims notices are
returned as undeliverable. Many shares are held in "street name," and
shareholders may become difficult to reach by moving their accounts to a
different brokerage firm or other depository institution. In other in-
stances, shareholders simply do not respond to claims notices, either be-
cause they find the documentation confusing or perhaps because they
109. See infra notes 1, 39-79 passim and accompanying text.
110. See 2 H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 10.14 (2d ed. 1985).
111. Compare, for example, the court decision dates and dates for class periods
parenthetically presented, infra note 108.
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decide the damages award is not worth the bother. "2 The experience of
practitioners and information in reported cases indicates that in a
number of instances substantially less than one hundred percent of class
members file proof of claims in class-action shareholder suits." 3
In the context of a settlement, the litigants have great flexibility, sub-
ject to court approval, in deciding how to handle the distribution of the
unclaimed portion of a lump-sum aggregate-damages fund." 4 They may
agree, for example, that funds for the benefit of the class should be dis-
tributed in a specified manner to class members who file proof of claims.
Because counsel for plaintiffs generally seek to maximize the return to
class members, this is generally the preferred approach. As a practical
matter, therefore, the difficulty in locating all class members will have no
depressing effect on the size of the settlement fund. On the other hand, if
the litigatants should arrange the settlement on a "claims-made" or "re-
versionary" basis, any unclaimed portion of a settlement fund may be
returned to the defendant, reducing his effective payment.1 5 If this ap-
proach is followed, estimates of aggregate damages should in some in-
stances be supplemented to allow for the possibility that proof of viable
claims will remain unfied. If the class-action litigation is to be settled on
a non-reversionary basis, however-in which case the agreed-upon lump-
sum settlement (less reasonable attorney fees and expenses) will be dis-
tributed among all available class members-it will generally be unneces-
sary to make allowance in damages estimates for unfied claims." 6
D. Employment of Estimated Aggregate Damages in Settlement
Procedures
The court must ultimately approve any settlement of a class-action
112. See 2 H. Newberg, supra note 110, at § 10.14
113. See, eg., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 477 n.4 (1980)(after extensive
efforts to locate class members, holders of 47% of affected securities submit claims); Zim-
mer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague, P.C., 758 F.2d 86, 92 (3d
Cir.)(upholding notice of settlement by first-class mail where plaintiff failed to prove 12%
response rate was unusually low), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985); Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)(n determining reasonableness of
settlement court considers fact that not all class members will come forward to prove
claim)(citations omitted), modified, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F.
Supp. 1372, 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(expert reduces damage estimate by 50% to account
for class members who won't file claims), aff'd 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434
U.S. 924 (1977); see also In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 746
& n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(describing process to locate claimholders), aff'd 798 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1986); report of settlement by Ralston Purina Co., National L. J. (April 23, 1984), at
3, col. 1 (settlement worth $25 to $50 million depending on number of class members
who file claims).
114. See 2 H. Newberg, supra note 110, at § 10.15.
115. See, e.g., Boeing, 444 U.S., at 476 (defendant could have right to unclaimed mon-
ies, but class members who proved claims should not share in unclaimed portion);
Elkind, 472 F. Supp., at 134 (unclaimed damages returned to defendant); 2 H. Newberg,
supra note 110, at § 10.15.
116. See 2 H. Newberg, supra note 110, at § 11.17.
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shareholder litigation. 7 In making this determination, the court must
consider whether the proposed settlement fund is reasonable in light of
the best possible recovery indicated by aggregate damages analyses and
all the attendant risks of litigation."'
Courts have found the most important measure of the adequacy of
settlement to be a comparison of the settlement consideration with what
the class could receive upon successful litigation, discounted for risks and
costs of litigation.' 9 Hence courts have approved settlements based on
even relatively small percentages of potential recovery. 2°
CONCLUSION
The Proportional Trading Model and Accelerated Trading Model pro-
posed in this Note extend the per-share damages calculation methods
that have previously been discussed in legal literature. These extended
models enable courts and litigators to estimate the potential aggregate
out-of-pocket damages in class actions brought under Rule lOb-5 for pur-
poses of settlement. The finance and market theories on which these
models are based provide the most objective basis for calculating share-
holders' net loss in transactions tainted by securities fraud. But as the
fraud-on-the-market theory gains wider acceptance in the courts and
among commentators, it is important to recognize the complications and
limitations in formulating damages estimates based on market behavior.
The inputs and assumptions that underlie the market-based models for
calculating per-share or aggregate damages are not obvious or automatic.
Different reasonable assumptions may occasionally lead to widely vary-
ing results.
Ultimately, there is no formulaic approach that eliminates all subjec-
tive factors. Careful factual analysis and informed judgment must leaven
computer-driven models.
Jon Koslow
117. "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all mem-
bers of the class in such manner as the court directs." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
118. See In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986); 2 H. Newberg, supra note 110, at § 11.40 -
§ 11.49; see also City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)(list-
ing factors to be considered in approving settlement proposal).
119. See In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 212 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1981); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp.
at 745.
120. See, e.g., In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. at 745 (12% of
reasonable damage figure is "surely within the range of reasonableness"); Bonime v.
Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)(approving $1.3 million settlement where
potential recovery is $12.8 million), aff'd 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S.
924 (1977); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 356 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (S.D.N.Y.
1972)(3.2% to 3.7% of potential recovery acceptable), aff'd in part, rev'd on other
grounds, 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
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